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ARTISTIC EXPRESSION TODAY: 
CAN ARTISTS USE THE LANGUAGE OF OUR CULTURE? 
MARK SABLEMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
To many of us who came of age in the era of the Vietnam War and the 
Nixon administration, Senator Thomas F. Eagleton epitomized the model 
democratic legislator—a smart and eloquent champion for what is right, even 
when it is not popular.  Those who knew him primarily in the last decade of his 
life (at least those few persons with whom he did not share his views on 
another mistaken war and arrogant president), may have seen a different 
person.  Particularly as his hearing loss progressed, Senator Eagleton 
readjusted his sensory focus and became an enthusiastic connoisseur of visual 
art.  He visited museums and galleries, and filled his home and office (and, to 
the delight of his colleagues, the corridors and rooms surrounding his office) 
with a hand-picked collection of paintings, photographs, and posters. 
Eagleton the passionate policymaker, and Eagleton the art collector, may 
seem like two different persons, or at least two quite different personas of a 
multi-faceted man.  But there are many connections between art and politics—
and in particular between art and political persuasion—at least one of which 
was a lifelong passion of Senator Eagleton. 
Political cartoons are born at the confluence of art and politics.  Senator 
Eagleton loved crafty and effective editorial cartoons.  He collected cartoons, 
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of MORE SPEECH, NOT LESS: COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE, published by 
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publications.  He also teaches Internet Law and Censorship & Free Expression, as an adjunct 
professor at Washington University School of Law.  He has been listed in Best Lawyers in 
America for First Amendment Law since 1997.  The author wishes to thank Professor Joel 
Goldstein, Michael Kahn, Fred Von Lohmann, and his wife Lynn for their comments on drafts of 
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and took special pride in the outstanding work of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch’s 
cartoonists, including Daniel R. Fitzpatrick, Tom Engelhardt, and John 
Sherffius.  He corresponded with cartoonists, congratulated them on their 
pointed artistic jabs, and encouraged them as they brought policy points home 
to readers in pictures truly worth many thousands of editorial column words.  
He delighted in the drawings of the pioneers of the genre, like Honoré 
Daumier, whose print Le Ventre Législatif (the Legislative Belly, or, very 
loosely, the Vile Body of the Legislature) unforgettably portrays corpulent self-
satisfied lawmakers arranged around the legislative chamber awaiting their 
bounty.1 
Art is expression.  It moves us, it motivates us, and it captures ideas and 
emotions.  There is no oddity in a man of politics being a man of art, too.  
Perhaps we should consider it odd when our political leaders do not display, or 
acknowledge, the inherent sensitivity of human beings to artistic expression. 
Whether the artist is Daumier in the France of Louis Phillipe, or Fitzpatrick 
of the Post-Dispatch in the 1950s, art is often closely tied to political thought.2  
Political passion and persuasion aren’t solely a matter of logic; they arise just 
as much from the emotions and hopes and dreams that reside deep inside each 
and every one of us—aspects of our personality that respond to art.  The 
principles and programs described in formal speeches by two opposing 
candidates often aren’t all that different.  But the images and hopes and 
aspirations of the two candidates, and the visions that they inspire—matters, 
like art, of emotion, feelings, and outlook on life—are often what really 
distinguish them from one another and what really motivate their followers. 
I.  ART AND LAW 
When something is as central to life as art, it is necessarily affected by the 
law. Some laws protect art and artists, like copyright and moral rights laws, 
and basic commercial doctrines like contract law.  Some laws regulate art, as, 
 
 1. The picture of overstuffed legislators shirking their public responsibility has outlasted 
Daumier.  A few years ago, I came across some prints of old Post-Dispatch editorial cartoons, 
and showed my finds to Senator Eagleton.  One of his favorites, a Fitzpatrick cartoon from May 
1957, captioned, “We have it under consideration,” portrayed two well-rounded senators (labeled 
“Senator Sidestep” and “Senator Stall”) studiously looking away from the Civil Rights Bill on the 
conference table before them. 
 2. The caricatures of Daumier and other French artists were viewed as such potent tools of 
political persuasion that they were subject to on-again, off-again spurts of official censorship in 
France by three different royal regimes between 1820 and 1881.  Robert Justin Foldstein, The 
Debate Over Censorship of Caricature in Nineteenth-Century France, 48 ART J. 9, 9 (1989).  The 
government viewed caricatures as more dangerous than the written word “because they were 
perceived as communicating more directly to people’s senses and emotions and hence more likely 
to incite immediate action.”  Id.  More than a score of artists were imprisoned at times for their 
roles in publishing drawings, including Daumier.  Id. at 10. 
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for example, the law of obscenity seeks to do.  And some laws stifle or control 
art, particularly where art touches public areas like government funding, public 
art, and publicly regulated forums like broadcasting. 
Art and law often mix like oil and water.  When James Joyce wrote a 
revolutionary version of an old story in a startling format peppered with raw 
human insights, the law fought hard against the artist and his work, closing off 
our country for years to that fresh look at life, and perhaps even fatally 
weakening the artist and his vision.3  When one artist criticized another in a 
classic clash of styles, the ensuing litigation took both artists from Olympus to 
the law courts, and solved nothing.4  When a sacrosanct pastor sued a rebel 
pornographer over a cartoon that nobody believed and everyone disdained, it 
took a climb up the ladder of justice to the Supreme Court before the fight 
ended with the simple rule: It’s okay to use art to make a point.5 
Art is an easy target for sophists, and our system, unfortunately, makes 
attack on art easy, and often even politically profitable.  One of the leading 
presidential candidates of the current day made his stand for demagogy not 
long ago by attacking avante garde artists for committing the sin of 
challenging religious and social orthodoxy.6  In the name of family 
friendliness, a local dedicated art gallery was told not too long ago that it must 
not display too prominently art that features the naked figure.7  A local 
religious leader has asserted that an artist who lacks his imprimatur of 
approved beliefs is unworthy to support a worthy cause.8  No simple principle 
of artistic freedom controls these cases.  Particularly when government is not 
 
 3. See United States v. One Book Called ULYSSES, 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); 
MORRIS L. ERNST & ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, CENSORSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR THE OBSCENE 93–107 
(1964). 
 4. In a classic nineteenth century British libel case, James McNeill Whistler sued John 
Ruskin, another artist, over Ruskin’s critical review of Whistler’s painting Nocturne in Black and 
Gold: The Falling Rocket.  Whistler eventually won the case, but received only one farthing 
damages and had to pay a share of the court costs.  Whistler had to file for bankruptcy shortly 
thereafter.  The verdict of history accords with Henry James’s assessment of the trial: “It would 
very possibly, therefore, have been much wiser on Mr. Whistler’s part to feign indifference.” 
HENRY JAMES, THE PAINTER’S EYE: NOTES AND ESSAYS ON THE PICTORAL ARTS 172–74 (John 
L. Sweeny ed., 1956).   
 5. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988). 
 6. Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999) (describing actions initiated by New York City’s mayor at the time, Rudolph Giuliani, 
against Brooklyn Museum based on controversial art exhibit). 
 7. See John Sonderegger, Angry Artist Withdraws Nude Sculpture of Adam, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 20, 2006, at A1 (describing incident in which a sculpture known as The 
Creation of Adam was pulled out of the Foundry Art Centre in St. Charles by St. Louis artist 
Philip Hitchcock because of what he calls “vigilante censorship” and the “systematic defacement” 
of his work). 
 8. Tim Townsend, Burke Quits Board in Protest of Crow, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH , Apr. 
26, 2007, at A1. 
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the censor, such sophistic censorship can be fought, if at all, only on collateral 
grounds. 
Our system has grappled for years with artistic expression legal issues, in 
many different ways.  It has solved some classic censorship problems, swept a 
few others under the cultural rug, and left a few others in a continuing seesaw 
of unclear rules and applications. 
At the outset, art is quintessential expression protected by the First 
Amendment.  This is so whether or not it carries an obvious political message, 
as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held: 
[I]t is clear that White’s self-expression through painting constitutes 
expression protected by the First Amendment. In painting, an artist conveys his 
sense of form, topic, and perspective. A painting may express a clear social 
position, as with Picasso’s condemnation of the horrors of war in Guernica, or 
may express the artist’s vision of movement and color, as with “the 
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock.” Hurley v. Irish-Am. 
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). Any 
artist’s original painting holds potential to “affect public attitudes,” Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 501, by spurring thoughtful reflection in and 
discussion among its viewers. So long as it is an artist’s self-expression, a 
painting will be protected under the First Amendment, because it expresses the 
artist’s perspective.9 
Thus, the First Amendment protection for free expression presumptively 
applies to all art, whether it consists of words or images, whether it is 
 
 9. White v. City of Sparks, No. 05-15582, 2007 WL 2429380, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 
2007) (parallel citations omitted).  The court found support for this position in both Supreme 
Court precedents and decisions of other circuits: 
  While not having spoken directly on the protections afforded visual art, the Supreme 
Court has been clear that the arts and entertainment constitute protected forms of 
expression under the First Amendment. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 
790 (1989) (music without words); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 
65–66 (1981) (dance); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (theatre); 
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932–34 (1975) (topless dancing); Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 34–35 (1973) (serious artistic work, unless obscene in the legal 
sense); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952) (movies). 
  . . . . 
  In holding that the First Amendment protects an artist’s original paintings, we join 
two of our sister circuits.  See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 
2003) (holding that “[t]he protection of the First Amendment . . . includes . . . music, 
pictures, films, photographs, paintings, drawings, engravings, prints, and sculptures”); 
Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[P]aintings, photographs, 
prints and sculptures . . . always communicate some idea or concept to those who view it, 
and as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection.”); see also Piarowski v. Ill. 
Cmty Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 628–32 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that stained glass 
windows, as “art for art’s sake,” were protected under the First Amendment). 
Id. (parallel citations omitted).   
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embodied in paper or on canvas or in stone or on a digital medium, and even 
whether or not it conveys a recognizable message. 
The wave of vigorous and broad-sweeping obscenity prosecutions that 
opened with the Comstockian book bannings of a century ago10 practically 
disappeared in the video revolution of the 1990s, as prosecutors learned that 
the rules of Miller v. California11 meant very little to middle-class juries whose 
members, friends, and/or neighbors watched X-rated videos behind the curtains 
of their suburban homes.  Book bannings are generally classified today like the 
witch hunts of the past.  Indeed a recent “civic reading” project in St. Louis 
promoted community-wide reading of Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451, a 
classic screed against book censorship.12  Today’s orthodoxy is so tilted 
against book bannings of any kind that citizens are encouraged to consume the 
targeted works (“Read Banned Books!”), even though First Amendment 
purists may wonder if their defense of extremists’ right to publish really should 
be equated with embrace of their content. 
Sideways attacks on allegedly scandalous art, such as the late Reverend 
Jerry Falwell’s attack on a parody cartoon as “outrage,” have failed.  Falwell 
sued Hustler magazine over a tasteless parody advertisement, which mimicked 
the then-current Campari liquor double entendre “My First Time” ads with a 
drawing that purported to show Falwell bragging of having had sex with his 
mother in an outhouse.13  After initial rulings that rejected Falwell’s libel and 
invasion of privacy theories based on such an obviously incredible cartoon, 
Falwell took his final theory—the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, sometimes known by the shorthand term “outrage”—to the United 
States Supreme Court.14  That staid court, dominated by Republican 
appointees, ruled unanimously against Falwell and in favor of Hustler.15  Or 
perhaps it is more accurate to say that the Court ruled in favor of the ability of 
all persons to participate in the long tradition (traced by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist back to the early days of the Republic, which featured brutal 
depictions of Washington and other revered Founders)16 of the “art of the 
cartoonist” which “is often not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and one-
sided.”17  The ruling in this bizarre case saved an art form: Eagleton’s beloved 
editorial cartoons. 
 
 10. See ROBERT W. HANEY, COMSTOCKERY IN AMERICA: PATTERNS OF CENSORSHIP AND 
CONTROL 20 (Da Capo Press 1974) (1960). 
 11. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 12. FAHRENHEIT 451: The Big Read @ Washington University in St. Louis, 
http://bigread.wustl.edu/events4.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
 13. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47–48 (1988). 
 14. Id. at 49–50. 
 15. Id. at 47, 57. 
 16. Id. at 54–55. 
 17. Id. at 54. 
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In other areas the law has been less hospitable to art.  Government can 
regulate some non-obscene artistic expression such as nude dancing for non-
content purposes such as protection of health and safety (pasties and G-strings 
being high-court-approved health and safety devices).18  In the broadcasting 
field, courts and the Federal Communications Commission struggle to apply 
the broadcast “indecency” rules of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (a case arising 
from a ban on seven “dirty” words)19 to a media world full of indecent words 
and pictures, most of which enter homes through means other than broadcast 
waves.  While the FCC has found a fuzzy bump-and-grind scene involving 
fully dressed teens indecent,20 an appeals court has told the agency that the F-
word can be just dandy for broadcast discourse.21 
Government sponsored or subsidized art work similarly falls in a murky 
area.  The federal government is permitted to impose quality artistic standards 
on the art it funds through the National Endowment for the Arts, according to 
the Supreme Court—though the Court’s ruling based on deliberately 
ambiguous congressional compromise language doesn’t confront true content-
based censorship.22  But government can’t wield its funding power to retaliate 
against art works that it doesn’t like.23 
So while art censorship is not fully settled, the overall results of these 
classic arts controversies seem sensible, and safe for art.  We aren’t censoring 
for obscenity or orthodoxy, and we’re not banning books.  We have protected 
the editorial cartoonists whose works represent the crown jewels of political 
expression.  And while we clumsily grapple and swing back and forth with 
broadcast indecency, we do so in the name of protecting children, not in the 
name of stifling speech.  One might readily conclude that artistic expression is 
relatively safe in modern America. 
But as our legal system has resolved or set aside many classic artistic 
censorship problems, it has made hardly a dent in an issue of equal seriousness.  
Specifically, how may artists use the commercial images of our culture in 
ordinary discourse? 
As the law stands now, and particularly as it continues in the direction of 
ever greater property-type protections for expression and content of all kinds, 
we face an emerging artistic expression problem of great significance.  It is the 
danger that overprotection of commercial interests will stifle and limit artistic 
 
 18. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991). 
 19. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 20. In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees, 21 F.C.C.R. 2732, 2735 (Mar. 
15, 2006) (notice of apparent liability for forfeiture). 
 21. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 462 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 22. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998). 
 23. Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
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expression that employs the language and symbols of our popular culture.  
Government can interfere with artistic expression in ways other than by 
banning or sanctioning expression.  Government action can also severely 
interfere with expression when it deprives artists of the words, symbols, and 
other expressive tools that will resonate with their audiences.  This government 
action may take the form of protection for content—i.e., protection for 
copyrighted materials, trademarks, and personal attributes—but its real effect 
may be to stifle communications.  Such interference is becoming a greater and 
greater threat in today’s imbalanced commercial world, where many of the 
tools and symbols of expression have effectively become privately owned. 
Artists create their works within the milieu of their own culture, and often 
portray, describe, or critique their culture.  Culture consists of the shared 
symbols, beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, artifacts, and modes of living of a 
place or period.  The constituent parts of culture, including its symbols and 
shrines, its values and manners, its leaders and idols, are basic and expected 
grist for art. 
In the past, it seems, the constituents of culture were freely available for 
artists to use.  The natural and man-made landscapes of agrarian times, the 
religious images dominant in devout times and places, the figures and faces of 
people in public—we see all of them in museum art, and know that these 
subjects carried no price tags and required no permission forms.  The images 
of today’s culture are different.  Put simply, the culture of the United States 
today includes Disney characters, Marilyn Monroe, Happy Meals at 
McDonald’s, Homer and Bart Simpson, James Gandolfini as Tony Soprano, 
popular movies, TV shows, and commercials, and the ubiquitous Starbucks. 
II.  ARTISTIC USE OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL 
It is an accepted truism that art builds on previous works.24  Many of 
Shakespeare’s stories were taken from Plutarch’s Lives.  The folk singing 
 
 24. See Richard A. Posner, On Plagiarism, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2002, at 23: 
  Mention of Shakespeare brings to mind that West Side Story is just one of the links in 
a chain of plagiarisms that began with Ovid’s Pyramus and Thisbe and continued with the 
forgotten Arthur Brooke’s The Tragical History of Romeus and Juliet, which was 
plundered heavily by Shakespeare. Milton in Paradise Lost plagiarized Genesis, as did 
Thomas Mann in Joseph and His Brothers.  Examples are not limited to writing. One 
from painting is Edouard Manet, whose works from the 1860s “quote” extensively from 
Raphael, Titian, Velásquez, Rembrandt, and others, of course without express 
acknowledgment. 
  If these are examples of plagiarism, then we want more plagiarism. They show that 
not all unacknowledged copying is “plagiarism” in the pejorative sense. Although there is 
no formal acknowledgment of copying in my examples, neither is there any likelihood of 
deception. And the copier has added value to the original—this is not slavish copying. 
Id. 
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tradition involves generations and generations of building upon earlier works.  
Many of the popular Disney movies are derived from pre-existing tales and 
works—including the first Mickey Mouse movie, Steamboat Willie, which was 
based on a silent film called Steamboat Bill, Jr., both of which were based on a 
previous song.25  Iconic works like the Mona Lisa and Grant Wood’s American 
Gothic are often imitated or reworked by artists pouring new content or 
meaning into well recognized images. 
Shakespeare had it easy, as a borrower of previous works, because he 
borrowed works from long ago and in any event he wrote before any copyright 
act.  Artists today face the situation where most works of the previous century 
are under copyright.  Can they then use and build on these works without 
offending copyright?  While our copyright law has long recognized some “fair 
use” rights, the extent and application of fair use has always been difficult.  
The United States Supreme Court took a major step in clarifying these rights 
for artists who parody previous works in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.26  
In Campbell, the rap music group 2 Live Crew wrote and performed a rap 
version of Roy Orbison’s song Oh, Pretty Woman.27  The rap 2 Live Crew 
version used music and introductory lyrics from the Orbison original, but in 
place of the original’s romantic references to “pretty woman,” it substituted 
references such as “big hairy woman,” “bald headed woman,” and “two timin’ 
woman,” and its lyrics in their entirety depicted the ugliness of street life.28 
Despite the clear copying, the Supreme Court concluded that 2 Live 
Crew’s version could be perceived as commenting on or criticizing the naiveté 
of the original work, and thus could be reasonably perceived as a parody.29  
The Court introduced into fair use analysis the issue of whether the new work 
was “transformative”—i.e., whether it added something new to the original 
work, thereby altering the expression, meaning, or message.30 
The Campbell decision also recognized that parody inherently involves 
copying, and even sometimes substantial copying.31  One cannot parody an 
original without copying enough of the original to bring it to mind.32  In 
another copyright parody case, involving parody photographs of a copyrighted 
doll, the Ninth Circuit refuted the copyright claimant’s assertion that the artist 
could have expressed his message some other way, or did not need to 
 
 25. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 22–23 (Penguin Press 2004). 
 26. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 27. Id. at 572. 
 28. Id. at 582, 594–96. 
 29. Id. at 583. 
 30. Id. at 579. 
 31. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. 
 32. Id. 
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photograph the complete copyrighted product.33  The court concluded that the 
photographer had the fair use right to use a copyrighted powerful popular 
symbol (the Barbie doll) in his parodic works, and that the parody wouldn’t 
work if only parts of the copyrighted work in question were used.34  Thus, 
while it is common in copyright fair use cases to view the use of the entirety of 
the copyrighted work as a factor weighing against the user, parody situations 
demand a different analysis, recognizing the parodist’s inherent need to use 
substantial portions of the copyrighted original. 
Though Campbell gave artistic parody a crucial fair use vote of approval, 
the issue of whether a subsequent work qualifies as a parody for fair use 
protection continues to bedevil many courts.  For example, in a case involving 
a parody of the famous novel Gone With the Wind (GWTW), a district court 
initially ruled that Alice Randall’s novel The Wind Done Gone (TWDG), 
telling the story of Tara from a plantation slave’s perspective, did not 
constitute fair use because it essentially constituted “a sequel” to GWTW, using 
only a different writing style than the original.35  The Eleventh Circuit 
reversed, accepting the author’s argument that her novel was a “critique of 
GWTW’s depiction of slavery and the Civil-War era American South,” despite 
borrowing a substantial amount of the original work.36  TWDG used numerous 
characters and settings from GWTW, and even copied the description and 
history of the characters, and their relationships with one another.37  
Particularly for the first half of the book, TWDG also copied GWTW’s story 
line and settings.38  Nonetheless, in view of the obvious criticism of GWTW, 
the court found that that TWDG was a parody entitled to the “fair use” 
defense.39 
Even if a derivative work contains some elements of parody, these 
elements may be insufficient to qualify as “fair use” parody.  In Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, Inc.,40 the 
defendants produced a musical production entitled Scarlett Fever, based on the 
novel and movie Gone With the Wind.41  The play was a comical and 
condensed version of the original works, but used many of their major scenes, 
in sequence.42  Although the musical did contain some elements of parody, the 
work as a whole was not a critical commentary of the original book or movie, 
 
 33. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2001). 
 36. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 37. Id. at 1267. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1277. 
 40. 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979). 
 41. Id. at 354. 
 42. Id. 
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and therefore was not a parody.43  For example, whereas some characters were 
used to “critically comment” on the characters in the original works, others 
were “treated strictly comically.”44  An example of a character treated “strictly 
comically” was Aunt Kitty Kat (based on Aunt Pitty Pat), who was played by a 
male actor.45  The court stated that her “purposely ill-concealed male identity is 
not parody or satire but rather pure comedy.”46  Based on limited use of the 
original works for parodic purposes, and substantial use of the works for other 
purposes, such as comedy, the Court determined that the play Scarlett Fever 
was not a parody when construed as a whole and thus did not qualify as fair 
use.47 
The Campbell, Suntrust, and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer cases, stripped to 
their essence, hold that parody of a previous work is protected as fair use, so 
long as the parody purpose—the author’s intent to use an original copyrighted 
work to create a new work that “at least in part, comments on that author’s 
works”48—is apparent and even pronounced.  The black-letter rule: 
Pronounced parody is protected. 
But what about use of prior works to comment on social and cultural 
issues, but not to comment particularly on the work that was used?  This 
technique, generally speaking, constitutes satire, not parody, and most courts 
have found such satiric use of portions of prior copyrighted works to be 
infringement, not fair use. 
A classic example of a satire was the book The Cat NOT In the Hat!: a 
parody by Dr. Juice.49 The book borrowed the style and characters of Dr. 
Seuss, the writer of distinctive rhythmical children’s stories, but the book did 
not comment on or criticize either Dr. Seuss’s style or his stories.50  It was, 
rather, a jaundiced and humorous adult look at the O.J. Simpson murder case 
and trial.51  In One fish, two fish, red fish, blue fish, Dr. Seuss wrote the stanza: 
“One fish / two fish / red fish / blue fish.”52  The alleged infringing book, The 
Cat NOT In The Hat!, included the equally memorable sequence: “One Knife? 
 
 43. Id. at 357. 
 44. Id. at 358. 
 45. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 479 F. Supp. at 358. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 355, 357. 
 48. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). 
 49. ALAN KATZ, THE CAT NOT IN THE HAT: A PARODY BY DR. JUICE (1996) (out of print), 
quoted extensively in Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F. 3d 1394 (9th 
Cir. 1997). 
 50. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 109 F.3d at 1401. 
 51. Id. at 1396. 
 52. Id. at 1401 (quoting DR. SEUSS, ONE FISH, TWO FISH, RED FISH, BLUE FISH 3 (Random 
House, Inc. 1988) (1960)). 
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/ Two Knife?  / Red Knife / Dead Wife.”53  Similarly, a narrative passage about 
the O.J. Simpson trial in The Cat NOT In The Hat! followed the stylistic 
cadences of the Dr. Seuss books: 
A plea went out to Rob Shapiro 
Can you save the fallen hero? 
And Marcia Clark, hooray, hooray 
Was called in with a justice play. 
A man this famous 
Never hires 
Lawyers like 
Jacoby-Meyers.54 
In the ensuing copyright litigation, the court rejected the authors’ argument 
that The Cat NOT in the Hat! parodied The Cat in the Hat.55  The authors 
argued that both stories involved immoral conduct, and ended with a moral 
dilemma.56  However, the court rejected these arguments as a “post-hoc 
characterization of the work [that] is ‘completely unconvincing.’”57  The court 
clearly viewed the authors as having used Dr. Seuss-like stylistic elements 
simply as a means for distinctively telling and commenting upon the Simpson 
trial story.58  Thus, the court upheld the district court’s finding that Dr. Seuss 
Enterprises showed a likelihood of success on the merits, and affirmed the 
copyright preliminary injunction against the publisher.59 
Similarly, in Rogers v. Koons,60 the Second Circuit found no fair use when 
the artist Jeff Koons directed the creation of a three-dimensional sculpture 
which closely replicated the design of a copyrighted photograph, showing a 
string of eight puppies on the laps of two individuals seated on a bench.61  
While Koons argued that his sculpture sought to satirize American society, the 
court found this defense insufficient.62  The Second Circuit held that an artist 
who simply wants to “make a statement on some aspect of society at large” 
cannot do so using a previously copyrighted work unless he makes the 
previous work at least in part an object of his parody: “Koons’ claim that his 
 
 53. Id. (quoting KATZ, supra note 49). 
 54. Id. (quoting KATZ, supra note 49). 
 55. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 109 F.3d at 1402–03. 
 56. Id. at 1402. 
 57. Id. at 1403. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 61. Id. at 304–05, 309. 
 62. Id. at 309–10. 
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infringement of Rogers’ work is fair use solely because he is acting within an 
artistic tradition of commenting upon the commonplace thus cannot be 
accepted.”63  If Koons wished to use the String of Puppies photograph as the 
basis for “a satirical critique of our materialistic society,” the court held that he 
would have to pay the customary price for copyright permission.64  (Of course, 
the court did not note that in this case, and many similar cases, the owner of 
the original copyright will not give permission, and thus, without fair use 
protection, such works are effectively unavailable for any artist’s satiric 
purposes.) 
For the most part, artistic copyright use cases follow the parody/satire 
distinction, despite the inherent difficulties in making the distinction and in 
having judges second-guess artists’ motives and purposes. 65  Particularly after 
Campbell, pronounced parodies seem to be safe.66  More subtle or borderline 
parodies are subject to the risky literary judgments of courts.67  Satire, and 
parodies that are so sexually related that they may be viewed as tarnishing the 
original work, however are generally found to be infringing.68 
When an artist’s work is classified as outside fair use, as with a subtle 
parody or a satire, the consequences for the artist can be harsh.  The artistic 
work may be destroyed, and any future publication, distribution, or display of 
 
 63. Id. at 310. 
 64. Id. 
 65. One recent exception is Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 
962 (C.D. Cal. 2007), concerning Family Guy, an animated comedy television episode that 
“routinely puts cartoon versions of celebrities in awkward, ridiculous, and absurd situations in 
order to lampoon and parody those public figures and to poke fun at society’s general fascination 
with celebrity and pop culture.”  Id. at 965–66.  While the court found a parodic purpose in a 
Family Guy episode that ridiculed Carol Burnett, the court’s fair use holding followed the 
traditional four factor test and did not require a finding of parody.  Id. at 967–69. 
 66. E.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding song When Sunny Sniffs 
Glue a fair use parody of song When Sunny Gets Blue); Elsmere Music, Inc., v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 
Inc., 482 F. Supp. 741, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding song I Love Sodom a permissible fair use 
parody of I Love New York tourism advertising jingle). 
 67. E.g., Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 91–92 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (The court found parodic purpose where alleged infringing song only used a 
portion of the original, using a defendant-friendly literary analysis: “The Forest sets up a contrast 
between the assertedly delusional innocence of mainstream culture and the purportedly more 
realistic viewpoint of the rapper, both by using cartoon characters as subjects and by quoting from 
and parodying Wonderful World.”). 
 68. E.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding Cunnilingus 
Champion of Company C was not fair use of the song Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B 
since the former “was neither a parody or burlesque” of the latter); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air 
Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding copyright fair use defense not available for 
parody cartoon where the copying had been more exact than was necessary for the parodists’ 
purposes). 
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it banned.69  Damages may be imposed, including statutory damages of up to 
$150,000 per infringed work, even in the absence of actual market damage to 
the copyright owner.70  And even before the artist gets his or her day in court, 
he or she may find the copyright owner utilizing its powers under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to have the work summarily removed 
from the Internet.71  Criminal penalties are also available for copyright 
infringement, although they are rarely used outside of deliberate counterfeiting 
situations.72  Artists who seek to create parodies or satires using copyrighted 
works must also be concerned about their potential legal costs, even if they 
ultimately prevail.  There is significant evidence that many artists give in to 
copyright threats, even when they believe they have acted within their fair use 
rights, because of these costs.73 
The split in copyright law between parody and satire thus limits options for 
artists who wish to utilize others’ copyrighted material in their own works.  
Only pronounced parody is relatively safe.  More subtle parody (such as that 
argued by the defendants in The Cat NOT In The Hat! case),74 or satire of any 
kind, is too risky and likely will not be viewed by courts as fair use.  In effect, 
the law is telling artists who wish to build upon existing copyrighted work—
even works like the Dr. Seuss books that have iconic and symbolic status in 
society—that they may create only in certain judicially approved ways 
(pronounced parody) and not in other ways (satire or subtle parody). 
Courts follow the parody/satire distinction because of concern that 
allowing satire is equivalent to allowing commercial infringement.  However, 
there are big differences between artistic satire and commercial 
misappropriation.  It is one thing to appropriate Dr. Suess’s words and style in 
a competing children’s book, or to sell String of Puppies art in competition 
with the original photographer, and yet another to create a work satirizing 
some aspect of American culture.  Satiric works generally do not compete with 
 
 69. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502(a), 503(b) (2000). 
 70. Id. § 504(a), (c)(2). 
 71. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A), (g)(2)(C).  Under the Online Copyright Infringement Liability 
Limitations section of the DMCA, a copyright owner may demand that internet service providers 
remove the internet works that the copyright owner reasonably believes to be infringing.  Id. § 
512(c)(3)(A).  The original poster is given an opportunity to have the work re-posted if he or she 
believes it is not infringing.  Id. § 512(g).  In practice, copyright owners are most knowledgeable 
and aggressive concerning the DMCA notice-and-takedown provisions, and posters whose 
postings make fair use of copyrighted material may not understand their fair use or re-posting 
rights.  See, e.g., Complaint, Lenz v. Universal Music Publ., Inc., No. 3:2007-CV3783-MEJ 
(N.D. Cal. filed July 24, 2007) (alleging improper takedown of home video based on overbroad 
copyright owner claims). 
 72. 17 U.S.C. § 506. 
 73. MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?: FREE EXPRESSION IN 
THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 37–45 (2005). 
 74. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1402–03 (1997). 
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the works that are used in the satire.  The Cat NOT in the Hat, for example, as 
a satiric adult book about a current-events trial, competes not at all with Dr. 
Suess’s children’s books.75  It should be possible to both uphold the freedom of 
artists to make satiric use of copyrighted cultural content, and protect the 
legitimate commercial interests of copyright owners. 
III.  ARTISTIC USE OF TRADEMARKS 
Consider next the prized icons of our commercial culture—trademarks.  
From McDonald’s golden arches, to the Windows start-up sound, to mere dabs 
of design (the Nike “swoosh”; the Apple Computer apple-missing-a-bite logo) 
or silly words (PEPSI; STARBUCKS; iPod) that nonetheless evoke Pavlovian 
consumer responses, brand names and logos dominate and in some ways even 
define our commercial culture.76  Artists who wish to portray or describe or 
critique that commercial culture will, in many cases, want or need to use those 
symbols. 
Trademark owners and courts are rarely understanding or hospitable when 
it comes to artistic use of trademarks.  After all, humor is not taught in law 
school intellectual property classes, and judges don’t get elected, nominated or 
confirmed by poking fun at revered institutions.  And apart from these practical 
issues, humor, avant garde art, and parody are legal outliers that don’t fit in 
any convenient legal pigeonholes.  Consequently, artistic parody using 
trademarks has had a rough ride in our legal system. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in past years found 
trademark law violations in a “Mutant of Omaha” parody about the threat of 
nuclear holocaust77 and in a “Michelob Oily” parody in a humor publication.78  
It seems hard to believe that anyone would take either of the parodies 
seriously.  The theory of the “Mutant of Omaha” decision was that the 
parodist’s T-shirts and coffee mugs, which mimicked the Mutual of Omaha 
 
 75. Id. at 1396. 
 76. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 147 (1973) 
(Brand names “drew together in novel ways people who might not otherwise have been drawn 
together at all—people who did not share a religious or political ideology, who were not voyaging 
together on the prairie nor building new towns.  The peculiar importance of American 
consumption communities made it easier to assimilate, to ‘Americanize,’ the many millions who 
arrived here in the century after the Civil War.”); HANNAH CAMPBELL, WHY DID THEY NAME 
IT. . . ? (1964) (“Coca-Cola is as American as apple pie and the hot dog.  It has woven itself to a 
remarkable degree into the fabric of the lives of the people of America, and rivals the flag itself in 
symbolizing the U.S.A. to millions of people all over the world.”  Id. at 65.  “Over a period of 
[seventy-five] years, Aunt Jemima has become a national institution.”  Id. at 42.  “Betty Crocker 
is known to almost every woman in the United States—and is truly America’s First Lady of 
Food.”  Id. at 20). 
 77. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 78. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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Indian head logo and added the words “NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST 
INSURANCE,” were likely to confuse customers shopping for Mutual of 
Omaha accident insurance.79  In the “Michelob Oily” case, a similar theory 
was asserted against a parody that was published in a tiny-circulation humor 
newspaper (titled Snicker), portraying black oil pouring onto the Anheuser-
Busch eagle.80  (The eagle responded with the word “Yuck!” in a cartoon 
speech balloon.) 81  In a city of serious beer consumers, the lack of official 
connection with the well-known brewer, and the attempted humor of the 
parody, was lost only in the courtroom. 
Not every trademark parody case is seen through such humorless eyes.  
There are, indeed, nearly indistinguishable cases in which opposite results 
were reached.  If anything, for example, the parody of the outdoors outfitter 
L.L. Bean that occurred in a sex magazine (portraying an “L.L. Beam [sic] Sex 
Catalog” in the same distinctive style as the well-known legitimate L.L. Bean 
catalog) carried more serious potential harm to the trademark owner, because 
of the tarnishment inherent in sexual associations.82  The First Circuit, 
however, recognized First Amendment concerns whenever a trademark owner 
claimed “the unfettered right to suppress the use of its name in any context, 
commercial or noncommercial, found to be offensive, negative or 
unwholesome.”83  Where a parody constitutes an editorial or artistic, rather 
than a commercial, use of plaintiff’s mark and particularly where the context 
negates commercial confusion such parodies should be permissible, according 
to the First Circuit.84  While trademark rights may permit some incidental 
impact on expressive rights in the commercial context, the court held, “It 
offends the Constitution, however, to invoke the anti-dilution statute as a basis 
for enjoining the noncommercial use of a trademark by a defendant engaged in 
a protected form of expression.”85 
Infringement or free expression?  (The artist might ask, “Humorless court, 
or one that gets it?”).  Trademark parody decisions go both ways, and even 
skilled commentators and practitioners must admit that the genius of the 
common law system—the slow-but-sure building up of clear principled rules 
 
 79. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 836 F.2d at 398. 
 80. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 28 F.3d at 772, 775, 780. 
 81. Id. at 780 (appendices showing parody advertisement). 
 82. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27 (1st Cir. 1987).  Indeed, the 
appellate decision discussed L.L. Bean’s claim of trademark dilution, a doctrine that protects 
against indirect harm to trademark interests such as diminution of the distinctiveness of a 
trademark through blurring or tarnishment.  Id. at 29–34.  L.L. Bean also asserted, though the 
appellate court did not discuss, trademark infringement, which requires the more difficult proof of 
likelihood of confusion of consumers in the commercial marketplace.  Id. at 27. 
 83. Id. at 30. 
 84. Id. at 32. 
 85. Id. at 32. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
202 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:187 
to ensure that like cases are decided in like manner—has yet fully to manifest 
itself in this field.86  Part of the problem may be that courts often view these 
cases narrowly, whether they choose the prism of trademark law or that of the 
First Amendment.  Trademark law protects trademarks, understandably and 
properly.87  First Amendment law just as understandably and properly protects 
expression.88  The interest one chooses to emphasize—trademarks or free 
expression—can readily determine the outcome of a case. 
It may be more fitting to view neither trademark law nor the First 
Amendment in isolation.  Trademarks are commercial symbols, but they are 
more than that in our commercial culture.  Some trademarks can become 
elements of our thought and expression, parts of our commonplace vocabulary, 
means by which we think and communicate ideas.  In the era of jewelers’ 
marks or public house signs, it may have been possible to isolate trademarks 
from the expressive vocabulary of society.  Today it is not. 
“That’s a Mickey Mouse idea”; “You’re my Superman”; “It’s finger-
lickin’ good!”; “E.T., phone home”; “You’ve got mail!”; “You’ve got spam!”; 
“Duh!”; “Yadda, yadda, yadda”; “The President sent his Star Wars plan to 
Congress”; “McMansion”; “This is a Kodak moment!”; “He’s a few french 
fries short of a Happy Meal”; “That’s all folks!”; “The Swiss Army Knife of 
catalogs”; “When it rains it pours”; “Mc-anything”; “Anything-busters.” 
We talk, and sometimes think, in trademarks.  This is not surprising, in our 
commercial culture, because trademarks are part of the language scene around 
us, and part of the culture we live in.  In the past people often quoted Scripture.  
In more literary times, places, and enclaves, they quoted Shakespeare.  Is it 
surprising that people in today’s culture use trademarks and trademark 
derivatives in their conversations?  If we recognize trademarks as elements of 
language as well as commercial tools, we can avoid the artificial separation of 
trademark and free expression doctrines.  Trademarks used as trademarks—
commercial symbols—deserve strong protection.  Trademarks that have 
significance beyond mere commercial symbols, and which have expressive or 
cultural meaning, ought to be available for expressive purposes as well as the 
traditional commercial identification purposes.  Does this penalize the 
trademark owner whose efforts have catapulted its trademark into the realm of 
cultural symbol?  Perhaps, but a trademark so strong that it is a cultural symbol 
 
 86. Many of the outlier cases involve sexual situations, perhaps because courts feel that the 
need to prevent such memorable but tarnishing associations outweighs the artist’s right to use the 
symbols for parodic purposes. E.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 8 Media L. Rep. 1016, 
1017 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (Screw magazine parody showing Pillsbury trade characters “Poppin’ 
Fresh” and “Poppie Fresh” engaged in sexual acts); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. 
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (use of uniforms similar to Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders in pornographic film found to constitute trademark infringement). 
 87. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000 & Supp. III 2003). 
 88. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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will likely retain its strength even when it is allowed to be used expressively.  
In reality, moreover, many of the most effective trademarks obtained their 
significance and prominence in part from contributions of the public, so it is 
hardly unfair to permit the public some continued ability to use them.89  
Finally, the alternative position—removing strong trademarks and cultural 
symbols from our cultural vocabulary available to our artists and 
commentators—is untenable in a society that values free and effective 
expression. 
We need, in short, a law of artistic and expressive use of trademarks that 
replaces the roulette spin between trademark black and First Amendment red 
with a realistic recognition of the cultural and expressive role that attaches to 
many trademark symbols.  A strong first step toward such a recognition 
occurred in a case involving one of America’s most recognizable trademark 
cultural symbols, the Barbie doll. 
Tom Forsythe, a photographer, created a series of photographs, called 
Food Chain Barbie, which portrayed unclothed Barbie dolls in bizarre kitchen 
situations—on a vintage malt machine, inside a blender, in a working fondue 
pot, and rolled in tortillas and covered with salsa in a casserole dish in an 
oven.90  As the court acknowledged, Forsythe’s Barbie photographs involved 
“various absurd and often sexualized positions.”91  Forsythe’s photos may not 
be everyone’s choice of art (in fact, they sold poorly) but they were a 
legitimate artistic creation, making a statement about an ever-smiling plastic 
culture of artificial and subservient beauty.  In Forsythe’s words: 
We blend, mix and confuse the ideal fantasy with the essence of our existence. 
Barbie may be only one of a great number of products contributing to a false 
sense of inadequacy, but in many ways, this product is the most potent single 
representation of the ubiquitous beauty myth. As a part of our cultural identity 
since being introduced in 1958, Barbie reveals the continuity of the commodity 
machine. In the same way, the doll retains its glazed, blissful smile regardless 
of its impending fate. While most of us at least start to grimace when we smell 
the heating oil that signals our demise, Barbie keeps a happy face courtesy of 
the image-makers who hope beyond hope that those of us on the receiving end 
will continue to do the same.92 
 
 89. Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1999).  
Moreover, in many cases, trademarks, copyrighted images, and even public personas may derive 
from the public domain.  The Aunt Jemima trademark ultimately derives from the female 
counterpart of Uncle Tom on Southern plantations.  The Colonel Sanders image, both a brand and 
a personal attribute of Harlan D. Sanders, is clearly based on the many gentlemen “colonels” of 
Southern historical legend and life. 
 90. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Tom Forsythe Artsurdism, http://creativefreedomdefense.org/bio_detailed.cfm (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
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Forsythe’s photographs taking an obviously critical look at Barbie as a 
cultural symbol were fair game for art lovers and critics, professors and 
students, and buyers and browsers.  But Mattel, Barbie’s creator and trademark 
owner, sued Forsythe in a three-year-long, $2 million legal marathon under 
several intellectual property theories, claiming that his use of its famous doll 
infringed its copyright and trademarks and diluted the value of its trademark.93  
Forsythe was able to afford the litigation only because of donated legal 
assistance.94  Ultimately, Mattel lost in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, which issued a decision upholding Forsythe’s right to parody and 
criticize Mattel’s creation.95 
In its decision, the appeals court both followed and extended the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc.96  The Ninth Circuit 
elicited from Campbell, the “Pretty Woman” case, a series of principles 
favoring the right to parody in all artistic media.97  The court first noted 
Forsythe’s critical purpose.98  While Mattel associated Barbie dolls with 
beauty, wealth, and glamour, Forsythe turned that image on its head, the court 
noted, “by displaying carefully positioned, nude, and sometimes frazzled 
looking Barbies in often ridiculous and apparently dangerous situations.”99  In 
some photographs, for example, “Barbie is about to be destroyed or harmed by 
domestic life in the form of kitchen appliances, yet continues displaying her 
well known smile, disturbingly oblivious to her predicament.”100  So 
understood, the photographs expressed social commentary, including 
observations on Barbie’s influence on women’s roles in society.101 
As to Mattel’s trademark claims, the court noted that symbols like Barbie 
have assumed “cultural significance” and hence artists have a right to use 
them, especially where the symbol is used for purposes of comparison, 
criticism, or point of reference.102 The court found a “great” public benefit “in 
allowing artistic creativity and social criticism to flourish,” and held that “[i]t 
is not in the public’s interest to allow Mattel complete control over the kinds of 
artistic works that use Barbie as a reference for criticism and comment.”103 
 
 93. Id.; Mattel, Inc., 353 F.3d 792. 
 94. Tom Forsythe, Food Chain Barbie & The Fight for Free Speech, NATIONAL COALTION 
AGAINST CENSORSHIP, Aug. 10, 2004, http://www.ncac.org/art/20040810~USA~Tom_Forsythe_ 
Food_Chain_Barbie.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
 95. Mattel, Inc., 353 F.3d at 816. 
 96. Id. at 800–01. 
 97. Id. at 800. 
 98. Id. at 800–03. 
 99. Id. at 802. 
 100. Mattel, Inc., 353 F.3d at 802. 
 101. Id. at 802. 
 102. Id. at 807 
 103. Id. at 806 
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The Forsythe case wasn’t Barbie’s first day in court, nor even her first loss.  
She and her Mattel lawyers lost in earlier suits against a parody website and a 
parody song.104  One could perhaps brush aside the Barbie cases on the ground 
that she is a unique well-recognized icon of an idealized American woman, 
whose image almost begs for use in parodies and social commentaries.  But the 
Forsythe decision directly confronted, and recognized, the artistic right to use 
cultural symbols.105  It recognized social good in such parodies, tracing that 
recognition to the policy inherent in the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Campbell.106  Such a recognition of trademark symbols as part of our cultural 
language can, if followed, permit artists, humorists, and commentators to use 
those symbols—and maybe even do so without the hit-and-miss predictability 
of prior law.  Such a result won’t destroy trademarks, or impede enforcement 
against true commercial infringement; it will simply place trademarks used 
expressively as cultural symbols within reach of artists.  And such a distinction 
between commercial and non-commercial use of trademarks would be 
consistent with recent case law that has placed many non-commercial activities 
outside the intended scope of the Lanham Act.107 
IV.  ARTISTIC USE OF NAMES, IMAGES, AND PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES 
Artists face problems not only with copyright and trademark law but also 
the laws that protect commercial appropriation of personal attributes—the 
doctrine known as the right of publicity.  On such grounds, celebrities have 
raised claims based on parody baseball cards (involving players like “Cal 
Ripkenwinkle” and “Ozzie Myth” of the “Credit Cards”),108 a billboard 
advertising a radio talk show which displayed the photograph of an often-
discussed celebrity,109 and even a silly advertisement that showed a robot 
turning Wheel of Fortune letters.110  In this area as well, legal decisions have 
 
 104. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2002) (use of Barbie 
in song held not to infringe Mattel trademark; use protected from dilution liability because use 
was non-commercial); Mattel v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315, 318, 324–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding 
fact questions on fair use where defendant attempted to comment on what she perceived as the 
sexual nature of Barbie through her use of customized Barbie figurines in sadomasochistic 
costume and storylines). 
 105. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d. at 806. 
 106. Id. 
 107. E.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 108. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 838 F. Supp. 1501, 1512 n.17–
19 (N.D. Okla. 1993), Report and Recommendation Rejected by Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major 
League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868 F. Supp. 1266, 1276 (N.D. Okla. 1994), aff’d, Cardtoons, 
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 963, 976 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 109. Britney Demands Removal of Unflattering Billboards, REUTERS, June 18, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1822181320070618 (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
 110. White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th. Cir. 1992). 
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been inconsistent and have not squarely confronted the cultural and expressive 
significance of the personal attributes used in the artistic works.  And as with 
copyright and trademark, several key rulings have placed legitimate artistic use 
of the content of today’s culture at risk. 
The right of publicity is an unusual and sometimes hard to understand 
aspect of American law.  While sometimes classified even by eminent scholars 
as part of the “right of privacy,” it actually relates to the ability of celebrities 
and others to profit from publicity given to their names, likenesses, and other 
personal attributes.111  It is often now classified alongside patent, trademark, 
and copyright as “a form of intellectual property that society deems to have 
some social utility.”112  At heart, it protects an individual’s right to benefit 
from commercial advertising use of his or her name, image, or other distinctive 
personal attributes.113 
An early and classic right of publicity case, Munden v. Harris, illustrates 
the doctrine and its understandable origins and purposes.114  The case was 
brought on behalf of Onel Munden, a five-year-old boy about whom we know 
little, except that he must have been a cute kid.115  Somehow a Kansas City 
jeweler, the Harris-Goar Company, had obtained a picture of little Onel, and 
used it in an advertisement the following manner: 
Papa is going to buy mamma an Elgin watch for a present, and some one (I 
mustn’t tell who) is going to buy my big sister a diamond ring. So don’t you 
think you ought to buy me something? The payments are so easy, you’ll never 
miss the money if you get it of [Picture of Plaintiff.] 
Harris-Goar Co., 1207 Grand Ave., Kansas City, Mo. 
Gifts for Everybody, Everywhere in their Free Catalogue.116 
The boy sued and Harris-Goar demmured to his petition, claiming that Munden 
had no recognizable right involving the advertising use of his likeness, and, 
citing a scattering of decisions, that had found no property interest in the use of 
a person’s name or image.117  The Court of Appeals squarely confronted the 
question of whether such a property interest should be recognized and found 
such a property interest reasonable and consistent with other legal rights: 
 
 111. Christoff v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 129–131 & n.6 (2007) (discussing 
Dean Prosser’s characterization of the right of publicity as one arm of the right of privacy, and the 
more modern characterization of it as an intellectual property like-tort of appropriation). 
 112. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 2001). 
 113. Id. at 807. 
 114. 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. App. 1911). 
 115. Id. at 1077. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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The privilege and capacity to exercise a right, though unexercised, is a thing of 
value—is property—of which one cannot be despoiled. If a man has a right to 
his own image as made to appear by his picture, it cannot be appropriated by 
another against his consent. It must strike the most obtuse that a claim of 
exclusive right to one’s picture is a just claim . . . One may have peculiarity of 
appearance, and if it is to be made a matter of merchandise, why should it not 
be for his benefit? It is a right which he may wish to exercise for his own 
profit, and why may he not restrain another who is using it for gain? If there is 
value in it, sufficient to excite the cupidity of another, why is it not the 
property of him who gives it the value and from whom the value springs?118 
The court accordingly recognized this “novel” right, essentially as a claim in 
tort and equity for unauthorized use of a plaintiff’s likeness: 
We therefore conclude that one has an exclusive right to his picture, on the 
score of its being a property right of material profit. We also consider it to be a 
property right of value, in that it is one of the modes of securing to a person the 
enjoyment of life and the exercise of liberty, and that novelty of the claim is no 
objection to relief. If this right is, in either respect, invaded, he may have his 
remedy, either by restraint in equity or damages in an action at law.119 
Cute little Odel Munden had been awarded the exclusive right to commercially 
exploit his cuteness.120 
After Munden v. Harris and other pioneering cases, including Haelan 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., which placed the Second 
Circuit’s inestimable imprimatur on the right of publicity,121 came the hard 
questions.  What besides a person’s likeness is covered by the right?  In what 
situations does the right apply?  And—what has proved to be the most vexing 
question—in which situations does the right not apply? 
Personal likenesses were protected from the beginning, as in Munden and 
Haelan.  Cases protecting personal names followed swiftly.  For both of these 
attributes, the reasoning seemed clear, for unauthorized use of either a person’s 
likeness or name in advertising would improperly exploit that person and 
mislead consumers about his or her authorization or endorsement for the 
advertisement.122  But coverage did not stop with names or likenesses.  For 
some well-known celebrities, even a small portion of their likenesses would 
evoke them.  As one court suggested, such publicly identifiable features as 
“Groucho Marx’s moustache, Bob Hope’s nose, Eddie Cantor’s eyes[,] or 
 
 118. Id. at 1078. 
 119. Munden, 134 S.W. at 1079. 
 120. Id. 
 121. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (recognizing a right of publicity in baseball players, 
giving them the right to authorize or prohibit the use of their likenesses on baseball cards given 
away as a bonus in chewing gum packages). 
 122. See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437–38 (5th Cir. 1994) (describing 
rationale for right of publicity protecting use of a person’s name or likeness). 
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Dolly Parton’s hairstyle” could bring those celebrities to mind.123  Next came 
slogans, as a court found the phrase “Here’s Johnny” to be so closely 
associated with NBC Tonight Show host Johnny Carson that it could not be 
used by a portable toilet company, especially one that promoted itself as “the 
World’s Foremost Commodian.”124  Subsequently, use of look-alikes in 
photographs,125 and sound-alikes in audio tracks,126 and even role-alikes 
(persons or things filling a role most often associated with the plaintiff)127 
entered the realm of right of publicity protection. 
Most right of publicity cases involved use of the personal names, images or 
attributes in advertising, and a body of case law developed recognizing that the 
right applied to commercial use or appropriation, usually meaning classic 
advertising.128  As with Munden and Haelan, in most cases the plaintiff’s 
name, likeness, or attribute was directly used to sell products.129  Especially 
where the advertisement suggested endorsement or authorization by the 
persons whose image, name or attribute was involved, coverage by the tort was 
clear.130 
As to what kinds of uses didn’t invoke the right of publicity, courts readily 
recognized exceptions for editorial, educational, and political activities.  
Publication of a celebrity’s photograph on a magazine cover, though it would 
probably aid sales, was recognized as privileged editorial use outside the scope 
of the proprietary right; to hold otherwise would inhibit legitimate news and 
editorial reporting.131  Documentaries for similar reasons were held exempt.132  
Political messages as well could not be deprived of the ability to use the 
 
 123. Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 473 N.Y.S.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), aff’d, 
472 N.E.2d 307 (N.Y. 1984). 
 124. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833, 836 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 125. Prudhomme v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 800 F. Supp. 390, 393, 396 (E.D. La. 1992); 
Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664–65 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); 
Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256, 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). 
 126. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098, 1112 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford 
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 127. Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809, 814 (9th Cir. 1997); White v. Samsung 
Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396, 1408 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 128. Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1982); Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. 
Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 540 (W.D. Tex. 1980). 
 129. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 503 F. Supp. at 542. 
 130. Id.; Cher, 692 F.2d at 639. 
 131. Time Inc. v. Sand Creek Partners, L.P., 825 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D. Ind. 1993); Namath 
v. Sports Illustrated, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11–12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff’d, 352 N.E.2d 584 (N.Y. 
1976). 
 132. Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1994); Benavidez v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1989); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
790, 793 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Creel v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 496 N.Y.S.2d 219, 220 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1985). 
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names, images and attributes of public figures.133  And various “incidental” 
uses—not real advertising, but often not fitting neatly in the editorial, 
educational or political categories, either—were also found outside the scope 
of protection.134 
The largely settled principles of the right of publicity, therefore, included a 
broad scope (not just name and likeness, but a broad array of personally-linked 
attributes), a “commercial use” element, and an editorial/educational/political 
exception.135  Left in the unsettled area, however, was artistic use.  To the 
question, “May an artist make use of a celebrity or another person’s name, 
image or personal attributes in a work of art?”, the only fair answer one may 
give today is, “I don’t know.” 
Some decisions have suggested an artistic right to use another’s name, 
image, or likeness for artistic purposes that is akin in certainty and scope to the 
well-recognized editorial exception.  For example, Janice Joplin’s estate was 
not permitted to enjoin a play in Seattle based on her life, the second act of 
which simulated an evening’s concert performed by Ms. Joplin.136  The court 
concluded that the use of a celebrity’s name in a play is free speech.137  
Similarly, a sculptor was held entitled to make and sell limited-edition 
sculptures portraying model Cheryl Tiegs.138  The court noted: “Works of art, 
including sculptures, convey ideas, just as do literature, movies or theater. . . . 
An artist may make a work of art that includes a recognizable likeness of a 
person without her or his written consent and sell at least a limited number of 
copies [without violating the right of publicity].”139 
In a major victory for artists, the Sixth Circuit rejected right of publicity 
and related claims asserted by Tiger Woods against an artist who sold limited 
edition art prints portraying Woods in connection with his victory in the 1997 
Masters Tournament.140  After rejecting trademark claims on descriptive use 
and other grounds (which included a finding that Woods’s claim to be “a 
walking, talking trademark” [the Court’s characterization, not Woods’s] was 
“untenable”),141 the court found First Amendment implications in Woods’s 
right of publicity claims.  Because the artist’s work, though sold for profit, did 
 
 133. O’Hair v. Skolrood, 17 Media L. Rep. 1869, 1870, 1872  (W.D. Tex. 1990). 
 134. Velez v. VV Publ’g Corp., 524 N.Y.S.2d 186, 189–90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) 
(advertisements relating to a magazine); Booth v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, 744 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1962). 
 135. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 585 (N.Y. 1984). 
 136. Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349, 350–51 (W.D. Wash. 1992). 
 137. Id.  However, the court also relied on a special California statutory exemption which 
specifically limits the right of publicity to only advertising and endorsements.  Id. 
 138. Simeonov v. Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017–18 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1993). 
 139. Id. at 1018. 
 140. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 141. Id. at 922. 
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not propose a commercial transaction, the court found it “entitled to the full 
protection of the First Amendment.”142  The court found that right of publicity 
and related Lanham Act false endorsement claims should be applied to artistic 
works “only where the public interest in avoiding confusion outweighs the 
public interest in free expression”—a situation unlikely to occur if the use of 
the celebrity’s image had “artistic relevance.”143 
But other important decisions have, ominously for artists, treated art as 
little different from a mere commercial product.  The Missouri Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Doe v. TCI Cablevision takes the art-as-commerce 
position.144  That case involved a work that, at least in most academic, literary, 
and artistic circles, would be considered a classic literary-artistic work: a series 
of comic books and videos.145  Created by Todd McFarlane, the Spawn comic 
book series was nothing if not creative: it featured a lead character who had 
descended to Hell, made a deal with the Devil, and returned to Earth with 
certain unknown powers imbued in Hell.146  This character has journeyed in 
more than 150 print editions (and one made-for-cable video) through classic 
physical situations, personal and romantic encounters, and business and 
political developments no less daunting (though certainly less uplifting) than 
those of more recognized literary journeymen like Odysseus and Dante.147 
Like Dante and perhaps like Homer—the ancient record being sparse as to 
the blind bard’s use of the names, likenesses, and personal attributes of his 
contemporaries—McFarlane did not create his characters from whole cloth.148  
In at least one notable case, McFarlane, a Canadian and a hockey fan, 
borrowed a character’s name from that of a St. Louis Blues hockey player.149  
The hockey player’s name was Tony Twist.150  The Spawn character’s name 
was Antonio (Tony) Twistelli.151  The hockey player was husky but boyish in 
appearance, with a full head of hair and trademark goatee, and was usually 
seen in a hockey uniform or casual attire.  The Twistelli character was a clean-
shaven balding middle-aged Mafioso who filled out a plus-sized business suit, 
 
 142. Id. at 925. 
 143. Id. at 928. 
 144. 110 S.W.3d 363, 375 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). The author was counsel to one of the 
original defendants in the case.  Those defendants were dismissed before trial, and the author did 
not participate in subsequent proceedings including the appeal commented upon here. 
 145. Id. at 366. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Ariel Carmona, Jr., Spawn #150, Dec. 6, 2005,  http://silverbulletcomicbooks.com/ 
reviews/113390334341490.html (reviewing the 150th edition of the Spawn comic book series); 
Hilary Goldstein, Spawn #150 Review: The Hellspawn Is Spun in a Whole New Direction, But Is 
That a Good Thing?, Oct. 25, 2005, http://comics.ign.com/articles/661/661426pl.html. 
 148. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 366. 
 149. Id. at 370. 
 150. Id. at 365. 
 151. Id. at 366. 
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wore sunglasses, and walked about in a Godfather-wannabe strut.152  Most 
everything, in short, was different between the comic book Twistelli and the 
real life Twist.153  There were, however, two similarities: the names, and the 
fact that both were “enforcers” of sorts.154  Twist was the fighter-“Enforcer” 
for the Blues, and Twistelli filled a similar role as the leading gangster in the 
Spawn series.155 
Twist won his right of publicity claims against McFarlane and the Spawn 
comic book publisher at trial, though the trial judge set aside the verdict as 
barred by the First Amendment.156  On appeal, the case presented the issues of 
how the right of publicity would apply to an artistic work like the Spawn 
comics, and the extent of the author’s First Amendment rights to use names 
and characters from contemporary society in his works.157 
The Missouri Supreme Court, after finding a prima facie right of publicity 
claim, determined that the free speech issue involved a weighing process: “not 
all speech is protected under the First Amendment, and in cases like this, 
courts often will weigh the state’s interest in protecting a plaintiff’s property 
right to the commercial value of his or her name and identity against the 
defendants right to free speech.”158  Quoting from Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co.,159 a right of publicity case in which a television station 
broadcast the entirety of a human cannonball’s act, the Court noted, “[t]he 
rationale for protecting the right of publicity is the straightforward one of 
preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of goodwill.  No social purpose is 
served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would 
have market value and for which he would normally pay.”160 
Moving from this focus on the right of publicity as a valuable commercial 
right owned by the plaintiff, the court next noted cases holding that that the 
traditional First Amendment constitutional malice test of New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan,161 did not fit in the right of publicity context.162  The court 
concluded accordingly that it had to find another test “to distinguish between 
expressive speech and commercial speech.”163  Commercial speech (using a 
 
 152. See Gina Holland, Celebs Ask Supreme Court to Protect Comic Creations: Hockey 
Player Had Sued Artist, Claiming Character Defamation, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 28, 2003, at 46. 
 153. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 366. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 367. 
 156. Id. at 365, 374–75. 
 157. Id. at 367–68. 
 158. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 372. 
 159. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). 
 160. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 372. 
 161. New York Times Co.v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 162. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 372–73. 
 163. Id. at 373. 
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person’s name or likeness in advertising or on a product package), it noted, 
constituted the core of the right of publicity.164  Expressive speech (“[f]or 
instance, the use of a person’s identity in news, entertainment, and creative 
works for the purpose of communicating information or expressive ideas about 
that person”) fell outside the scope of the right, as the editorial/educational/ 
political exception precedents showed.165 
The court reviewed the “relatedness” test described in the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition, which essentially described the editorial 
exception—the right to use a person’s name or likeness when it was related to 
a news or educational publication.166  It next reviewed the “transformative test” 
used in the admittedly quite similar case of Winter v. D.C. Comics,  where a 
comic book that contained significant expressive content other than plaintiffs’ 
mere likenesses was held outside the scope of the right of publicity.167  The 
court rejected both approaches, for the somewhat conclusory reason that these 
expressive-protective tests “preclude a cause of action whenever the use of the 
name and identity is in any way expressive, regardless of its commercial 
exploitation.”168  The court then approvingly cited an article by an advocate for 
right of publicity plaintiffs, which argued, contrary to the expressive-protective 
relatedness and transformative tests, that free speech defenses should not work 
where commercial exploitation “predominates” over expressive purposes.169  
And finally, the court purported to apply that test, but did so with the twist that 
the determination of commercial predominance over expressive content rested 
on the court’s own literary judgment about the “value” of the Spawn work: 
As discussed, Twist made a submissible case that respondents’ use of his name 
and identity was for a commercial advantage.  Nonetheless, there is still an 
expressive component in the use of his name and identity as a metaphorical 
reference to tough-guy “enforcers.”  And yet, respondents agree (perhaps to 
avoid a defamation claim) that the use was not a parody or other expressive 
comment or a fictionalized account of the real Twist. As such, the 
metaphorical reference to Twist, though a literary device, has very little 
literary value compared to its commercial value.  On the record here, the use 
and identity of Twist’s name has become predominantly a ploy to sell comic 
books and related products rather than an artistic or literary expression, and 
under these circumstances, free speech must give way to the right of 
publicity.170 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995)). 
 167. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 373–74 (citing Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 
473 (Cal. 2003)). 
 168. Id. at 374. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. (emphasis added). 
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The Doe holding, though hardly crystal clear, appears to put artists in a 
near-impossible dilemma when they seek to use any cultural content that may 
implicate the right of publicity.  It clearly rejects both established expressive-
protective tests—the “relatedness” test (which underlies the 
editorial/educational/political exceptions to the right of publicity, recognized in 
many cases in other jurisdictions) and the “transformative” test (which derives 
from the Winter case involving a work of visual art, and ultimately from the 
Campbell case involving a musical art form).171  It substitutes, instead, a 
purported 50-50 test, in which no First Amendment preference is afforded for 
expressive elements, and it applies that 50-50 test in a manner that can only 
give chills to modern artists—by classifying use of merely a name and a vague 
persona (the “enforcer” image) in a non-mainstream non-parody work as 
having “little literary value” and being but a “ploy” of exploitation.172  Only 
Rembrandt and maybe Missouri’s favorite son artist Thomas Hart Benton 
appear safe under this test.  Particularly given the few scattered references to 
Antonio Twistelli in the many Spawn issues, and the many other creative 
elements in the series and even in the Twistelli character, the court’s 
conclusion of commercial exploitation being predominant over expressive 
artistry will hardly be apparent to most artists.  Any artist of the last fifty years, 
particularly one who uses alternative media, avant garde techniques, or 
popular culture content, must seriously worry that his or her reviews will not 
be favorable in the Missouri Supreme Court. 
The Doe decision, though important for Missourians and because of its 
unique and extreme position giving little weight to the artist’s expressive 
content, is illustrative of decisions that elevate right of publicity commercial 
interests over artistic freedom.  In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc., the California Supreme Court applied a test very similar to Doe, 
purporting to balance an artist’s creativity against the celebrity’s right of 
publicity.173  There, an artist made a charcoal drawing of the Three Stooges, 
and sold his work in lithographs and T-shirts.174  Initially, the court examined 
whether the defendant’s works fell within the California right of publicity 
statute, which required sale of a “product,” but it determined that even 
lithographic prints constituted covered “products.”175  Moving to the content of 
the artist’s work, the court recognized that artwork portraying celebrities can 
have significant expressive value, like other First Amendment protected 
expression: 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 374. 
 173. 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001). 
 174. Id. at 800–01. 
 175. Id. at 802. 
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Because celebrities take on public meaning, the appropriation of their 
likenesses may have important uses in uninhibited debate on public issues, 
particularly debates about culture and values.  And because celebrities take on 
personal meanings to many individuals in the society, the creative 
appropriation of celebrity images can be an important avenue of individual 
expression.  As one commentator has stated: “Entertainment and sports 
celebrities are the leading players in our Public Drama. We tell tales, both tall 
and cautionary, about them.  We monitor their comings and goings, their 
missteps and heartbreaks.  We copy their mannerisms, their styles, their modes 
of conversation and of consumption. Whether or not celebrities are ‘the chief 
agents of moral change in the United States,’ they certainly are widely used—
far more than are institutionally anchored elites—to symbolize individual 
aspirations, group identities, and cultural values.  Their images are thus 
important expressive and communicative resources: the peculiar, yet familiar 
idiom in which we conduct a fair portion of our cultural business and everyday 
conversation.”176 
The court recognized as well that art need not have an overt political 
message to deserve First Amendment protection: 
[T]he United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a work of art is 
protected by the First Amendment even if it conveys no discernable message: 
“[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional 
protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized 
message,’ [citation], would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting 
of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll.”  (Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group 
of Boston, Inc. (1995) 515 U.S. 557, 569.) 
  Nor does the fact that Saderup’s art appears in large part on a less 
conventional avenue of communications, T-shirts, result in reduced First 
Amendment protection.  As Judge Posner stated in the case of a defendant who 
sold T-shirts advocating the legalization of marijuana, “its T-shirts . . . are to 
[the seller] what the New York Times is to the Sulzbergers and the Ochs—the 
vehicle of her ideas and opinions.”  (Ayres v. City of Chicago (7th Cir. 1997) 
125 F.3d 1010, 1017; Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15 [jacket with 
words “Fuck the Draft” on the back is protected speech].)  First Amendment 
doctrine does not disfavor nontraditional media of expression.177 
Thus, the court recognized that the artist deserved First Amendment 
protection—but went on to require a balancing of that right with the Three 
Stooges’ right of publicity, which it portrayed as a product of “creative 
labor.”178  The court admitted the difficulty in making the balance, and even 
 
 176. Id. at 803 (citing Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture 
and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 128 (1993)). 
 177. Id. at 804. 
 178. Comedy III Productions, Inc., 21 P.3d at 804–05. 
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appeared to suggest that the First Amendment requires significant deference to 
expressive rights in weighing the balance: 
Once the celebrity thrusts himself or herself forward into the limelight, the 
First Amendment dictates that the right to comment on, parody, lampoon, and 
make other expressive uses of the celebrity image must be given broad scope. 
The necessary implication of this observation is that the right of publicity is 
essentially an economic right. What the right of publicity holder possesses is 
not a right of censorship, but a right to prevent others from misappropriating 
the economic value generated by the celebrity’s fame through the 
merchandising of the “name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness” of the 
celebrity.179 
Borrowing from the “transformative” copyright fair use doctrine of 
Campbell, the court ultimately suggested a sufficient transformation test, 
which looks to “whether the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ 
from which an original work is synthesized” (which would weigh in favor of 
free expression) or “whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the 
very sum and substance of the work in question” (which would weigh in favor 
of the right of publicity).180  In the case at hand, the court, as in Doe, assumed 
an art critic’s role, and assessed the artistic content of the defendant’s Three 
Stooges charcoal drawing.181  The assessment: “we can discern no significant 
transformative or creative contribution.”182  Saderup’s literal style was found 
undeserving of any artistic privilege from a right of publicity claim. 
Some may defend the current law on the ground that artists can, indeed, 
use celebrity images, trademarks, and even copyrighted works if only they 
obtain and pay for permission.  Indeed, this was the California Supreme 
Court’s retort to Saderup’s assertion that its decision singled out his literal 
artistic style, and hampered his ability to portray celebrities, while it permitted 
more abstract portrayals.  You can do it, too, the court told Saderup—you just 
have to get permission.183  Seeking and obtaining permission sometimes 
 
 179. Id. at 807. 
 180. Id. at 809. 
 181. See id. at 810–11. 
 182. Id. at 811. 
 183. As the court explained: 
Saderup argues that it would be incongruous and unjust to protect parodies and other 
distortions of celebrity figures but not wholesome, reverential portraits of such celebrities.  
The test we articulate today, however, does not express a value judgment or preference for 
one type of depiction over another.  Rather, it reflects a recognition that the Legislature 
has granted to the heirs and assigns of celebrities the property right to exploit the 
celebrities’ images, and that certain forms of expressive activity protected by the First 
Amendment fall outside the boundaries of that right.  Stated another way, we are 
concerned not with whether conventional celebrity images should be produced but with 
who produces them and, more pertinently, who appropriates the value from their 
production.  Thus, under section 990, if Saderup wishes to continue to depict The Three 
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works.  Andy Warhol, for example, after being surprised by some copyright 
claims for his clearly derivative works, made it his practice later in his career 
to obtain permissions when he used trademarks such as the Campbell’s soup 
can and the Brillo soap pad package and when he used celebrity images like 
those of Marilyn Monroe.184  It worked for Warhol because he was already 
famous, and because the trademark owners and celebrities involved knew that 
his works would be positive and even celebratory, not critical.  Often they gave 
permission without charge, knowing that Warhol images would only enhance 
their trademarks or personal fame.185  Indeed, several trademark owners later 
adapted their designs to the way Warhol drew them.186  Getting permissions, 
however, can be a cumbersome, costly, and sometimes impossible for non-
famous artists, particularly those whose works cast their subjects in a critical 
light.187  It is obvious what answer an artist can expect to the request, “May I 
purchase the rights to use your image in a critical artwork?”  A legal right of 
artistic use is the only realistic means for artists to have access to personal 
names and images. 
Considered against the broad scope of the right of publicity—recall that 
use of just a distinctive moustache can invoke it, and that even robots can 
infringe if they happen to play a role that brings to mind a particular 
celebrity—the plaintiff-favorable Doe test and the similar Comedy III 
Productions test could significantly inhibit the creation of creative works that 
include portrayals of contemporary persons, celebrities, or even fictitious 
characters.  In today’s world, that means that a significant amount of the 
content and symbols of our culture is available to artists only with significant 
legal risk and uncertainty. 
We are a celebrity-dominated culture; there can be no mistake about this.  
Celebrities are top-of-consciousness foci of our attention.188  Top celebrity first 
 
Stooges as he has done, he may do so only with the consent of the right-of-publicity 
holder. 
Comedy III Productions, Inc., 21 P.3d at 811. 
 184. DAVID BOLLIER, BRAND NAME BULLIES: THE QUEST TO OWN AND CONTROL CULTURE 
48–55 (2005). 
 185. Id. at 54. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See generally SUSAN M. BIELSTEIN, PERMISSIONS A SURVIVAL GUIDE: BLUNT TALK 
ABOUT ART AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2006). 
 188. See TYLER COWEN, WHAT PRICE FAME? 7 (2000): 
In short, ours is a culture steeped in fame.  Modern talk show hosts, such as Oprah 
Winfrey, have daily audiences ranging from 10 to 20 million people.  The Barbara 
Walters interview with Monica Lewinsky was watched by over 70 million Americans, a 
record for a news program, if it may be called that.  Graceland draws more visitors per 
year—750,000—than does the White House.  Boris Yeltsin, when he visited America, 
asked as he stepped off the plane: “Do you think O.J. did it?”  Michael Jordan, the subject 
of seventy books and one of the most widely recognized figures in the world, is an 
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names need no further elaboration: Oprah, Diana, Marilyn.  Even the staid 
business world has its own celebrities, like Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, Donald 
Trump, and Jack Welch.  A mass media culture probably inherently focuses on 
celebrities, and indeed conveys temporary celebrity status even on ordinary 
persons who for some reason or another achieve Andy Warhol’s famous 
“fifteen minutes of fame.”  A century ago, when school children were surveyed 
about the persons they most admired, George Washington and Abraham 
Lincoln led the list, and other social and political leaders filled it out.189  In 
1948, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Clara Barton topped the list, which this time 
included entertainers like Gene Autrey and Betty Grable and sports figures like 
Ted Williams and Babe Ruth.190  By 1986, a list of persons most admired by 
teenagers consisted almost entirely by entertainment celebrities, like Bill 
Cosby, Sylvester Stallone, and Eddie Murphy; the only political figure that 
appeared was Ronald Reagan, an actor turned politician.191  Many artists in this 
celebrity-focused culture will naturally wish to use the celebrity content of our 
culture as grist for their works.  As the Sixth Circuit noted in ETW: 
[T]hrough their pervasive presence in the media, sports and entertainment 
celebrities have come to symbolize certain ideas and values in our society and 
have become a valuable means of expression in our culture.  As the Tenth 
Circuit observed “[c]elebrities . . . are an important element of the shared 
communicative resources of our cultural domain.”192 
Decisions like Doe, however, are likely to inhibit artistic works making use of 
these cultural symbols. 
As with copyright and trademark law, right of publicity law should evolve 
to accommodate legitimate artistic expressive interests, including the basic 
need of artists to be able to use the content of our celebrity culture in their 
works.  Such an accommodation can be made without depriving future Odel 
Mundens of the value of their cuteness, or even the future Tony Twists of the 
opportunity to commercially exploit their personal fame.  Such an 
accommodation will, most importantly, free the artists of our day to portray 
and comment upon our lives and society in the same way that Rembrandt 
portrayed Holland of his time and that Max Beckman portrayed early 
Twentieth Century Germany.  The resulting art may well give us all, as art 
consumers, some of those wonderful pleasures, insights, and openings into new 
worlds that Tom Eagleton found in his journeys in the art world. 
 
industry unto himself.  In 1998 Fortune magazine estimated his career net economic 
impact at $10 billion. 
 189. Id. at 47. 
 190. Id. at 47–48. 
 191. Id. at 48. 
 192. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937–38 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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CONCLUSION 
The law hasn’t found it easy to deal with art.  Perhaps this is because art 
isn’t clear and literal, like a dollars-and-cents commercial transaction.  Perhaps 
it is because art isn’t predictable, like railroads, automobiles, and industrial 
equipment.  Perhaps it derives from the fact that artistic frontiers change, 
unlike the known boundaries of our cities, counties, states, and nations.  
Perhaps, at root, it has something to do with the simple fact that art affects 
people, often deeply.  We may perhaps even borrow from Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr. (who Senator Eagleton admired and sometimes socialized with at 
his friend Joseph Rauh’s Virginia parties) who defined sex as “a great and 
mysterious motive force in human life.”193 
Art, too, can be great and mysterious in its effect on people, and the pursuit 
and receipt of artistic expression can be a “motive force” for many artists and 
art lovers.  Legislators, courts, and business executives often seek control.  Art 
can’t be controlled.  It breaks barriers, opens up new ways of thinking about 
the world, and moves people mysteriously, at an emotional and cultural level 
not open to objective scrutiny.  And neither can or should the constituent 
elements of art be controlled, or removed from accessibility.  Artists should be 
able to use the symbols and constituents of their culture in order to create their 
images and messages. 
Lawyers, legislators, courts, and other policy makers should take care that 
the elements of culture are not legally barred from artistic and other critical 
expressive use.  The law can adequately protect intellectual property rights if it 
confines their enforcement to the commercial arena.  Blocking the elements of 
contemporary culture from artists, behind judicially enforced “no trespassing” 
signs, would be just as great a mistake today as Comstockian censorship 
schemes were a century ago.  We will best honor artists, art lovers like Senator 
Eagleton, and First Amendment free expression rights, by allowing artists to 
use the language and symbols of our culture. 
 
 
 193. Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). 
